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By introducing the notion of a “second quantification of physics,” this paper makes an original 
historiographic contribution to the history of physics and philosophy of measurement. In outline, the 
second quantification begins in the 1840s with the attempts of Gauss and Weber to ensure the global 
comparability of measurements of terrestrial magnetism, and closes with the outsourcing of 
standardization work from the physics laboratory to the newly-created national metrological institutes 
of the 1890s and 1900s. The most critical phase took place between 1863 and 1881. During this time, 
physicists working through the British Association for the Advancement of Science under the de facto 
leadership of William Thomson integrated measuring scales for physical quantities into a system of so-
called “absolute” units and obtained its international sanction. Their “CGS” (centimetre-gramme-
second) system ultimately supplied the basis for modern metrology (Quinn 2017). 
 
The integration of measuring scales, or the invention of absolute units, more than any other feature 
distinguishes the second quantification from the traditional quantification of physics that historians 
locate within the period 1780–1830. During this time, many quantitative physical concepts, such as 
latent heat and electrical capacity, were defined and operationalized (Heilbron 1993; Frängsmyr et al. 
1990). Conventional historiography incorporates this process into the development of a unified 
mathematical-experimental methodology that provides a de facto “big picture” of nineteenth century 
physics (Buchwald and Hong 2003, cf. Simon 2016). This big picture has made the profound changes to 
the theoretical structure of measurement that I argue characterized the second quantification difficult 
to spot (see e.g. Smith and Wise 1989). Departures from the big picture relating to the development of 
units and standards have largely taken the form of socio-institutional microstudies, which are inherently 
unsuitable for identifying long-term epistemological trends like a second quantification (e.g. Schaffer 
1995; O’Connell 1993). Existing work in integrated HPS has sought to explain the specificity of the 
epistemic challenges involved in the historical construction of measuring scales for individual physical 
quantities (Miyake 2017; Chang 2004) without, however, bringing in the need to co-ordinate activity 
across epistemic discontinuities between different communities of practice (cf. Galison 1997; Star and 
Griesemer 1989). 
 
With this historical and philosophical background in mind, I offer three reasons why the second 
quantification merits the name, and indicate, however briefly, how historically it gave rise to recognized 
issues in the philosophy of measurement relating to units, quantities, and dimensions: 
 
1. The substantiveness of the conceptual, physico-mathematical and operational issues involved in the 
historical definition and realization of absolute units. Several overlapping criteria can be identified for a 
unit to be “absolute” (cf. Mitchell 2017): 
a) reduction: all measurements must ultimately be traceable to “fundamental” units of mass, length, 
and time via a network of empirical laws. 
b) economy: a “coherent” selection of units that eliminated conversion coefficients. For example, unit 
velocity would be unit length traversed in unit time. 
c) objectivity: the fundamental units should be linked to unchanging features of nature. Historically this 
produced a shift from artefacts to properties of the Earth, and then to properties of atoms and 
fundamental constants. 
The practice of absolute measurement consisted in the development of experimental protocols that 
realized these criteria, the construction or employment of measurement standards based upon them, 
and the associated expression of the numerical results of measurement in forms specially adapted to 
the unique mathematical properties arising from (a) and (b). I locate the ambiguous physico-
mathematical status of “fundamental physical constants” (see e.g. Riordan 2014) in the inability to 
reconcile the numerical values of measurements of static and current electricity. The mathematical 
conversion factors introduced by Maxwell as a temporary solution in violation of (b) came to be seen as 
denoting properties of a medium that transmitted electrical (and magnetic) force. 
2. The development of novel algebraic practices for representing physical quantities and the results of 
measurement in experimental physics. In conformity with (a), modern metrology allows for the 
algebraic expression of the numerical results of measurement in terms of a dimensional formula that 
indicates the variation of a derived quantity with the fundamental or “base” units. One Newton (N) of 
force, for example, can be expressed as 1 m.kg.s-2. At the time of Maxwell’s invention of the 
dimensional formula (1863), however, algebraic operations had only been defined for numbers and not 
physical units. To validate these forms required Maxwell to introduce a syntactic mode of mathematical 
intelligibility from higher mathematics into the practical algebra of physical measurement. This mode 
was wholly foreign to experimental physicists, who took for granted that mathematical symbols and 
operations would correspond to physically-realizable ones. Controversies developed between the 
followers of Maxwell and those of Thomson, who opposed the modern forms. Unlike previous historico-
philosophical analyses (de Courtenay 2015; de Boer 1994/5), these findings open up distinct 
components of the process by which the modern quantity calculus was developed for study, and provide 
a framework for explaining why these components were not brought together until after the First World 
War. 
3. The pursuit of a widespread program of theoretical and experimental implementation among many 
different types of physical practitioners. Securing the long-term future of absolute units required 
physicists to convince other professional groups of their necessity and transmit a raft of relevant 
cognitive and practical skills. I describe how this demanded the development of new pedagogical tools 
and rhetorical devices, and explain why it took decades of persistence. Telegraph engineers, for 
instance, struggled with a fundamental conceptual distinction between a unit and a material standard. 
They consequently reacted with incredulity when informed that electrical resistance in absolute 
(electromagnetic) units could be expressed “as a velocity,” or in so many metres-per-second, in 
conformity with the dimensional formula LT-1 (Mitchell 2017). I explain briefly how ambiguities in the 
meaning of dimensional formulae and their relationship to units and physical quantities (see e.g. 
Sterrett, forthcoming) can be traced to attempts to bridge the gulf in intelligibility between physicists 
and telegraph engineers. 
 
References 
Buchwald, Jed and Hong, Sungook (2003). “Physics,” in David Cahan (ed.), From Natural Philosophy to 
the Sciences. Writing the History of Nineteenth-Century Science (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2003), pp.163–95. 
Chang, Hasok (2004). Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress (Oxford: OUP). 
De Boer, Jan (1994/5). “On the History of Quantity Calculus and the International System,” Metrologia 
31, pp. 405–29. 
De Courtenay, Nadine (2015). “The Double Interpretation of the Equations of Physics and the Quest for 
Common Meanings,” in Oliver Schlaudt and Lara Huber (eds), Standardization in Measurement (London: 
Pickering and Chatto, 2015), pp. 53–68. 
Frängsmyr, Tore; Heilbron, John; and Rider, Robin E. (1990). The Quantifying Spirit in the 18th Century 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA.: University of California Press). 
Galison, Peter (1997). Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press). 
Heilbron, John (1993). Weighing Imponderables and Other Quantitative Science around 1800 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press). 
Miyake, Teru (2017). “Magnitude, Moment, and Measurement: The Seismic Mechanism Controversy 
and its Resolution,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 65–66, pp. 112–120. 
Mitchell, Daniel Jon (2017). “Making Sense of Absolute Measurement: James Clerk Maxwell, William 
Thomson, Fleeming Jenkin, and the Invention of the Dimensional Formula,” Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Modern Physics 58, pp. 63–79. 
Quinn, Terry (2017). “From Artefacts to Atoms: A New SI for 2018 to be Based on Fundamental 
Constants,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 65–66, pp. 8–20. 
O’Connell, Joseph (1993). “Metrology: The Creation of Universality by the Circulation of Particulars,” 
Social Studies of Science 23:1, pp. 129–73. 
Riordan, Sally (2015). “The Objectivity of Scientific Measures,” Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science 50, pp. 38–47. 
Schaffer, Simon (1995). “Accurate Measurement is an English Science.” In M. Norton Wise (ed.), The 
Values of Precision (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 135–72. 
Simon, Josep (2016). “Writing the Discipline: Ganot’s Textbook Science and the ‘Invention’ of Physics,” 
Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 46:3, pp. 392–427. 
Smith, Crosbie and Wise, M. Norton (1989). Energy and Empire: A Biographical Study of Lord Kelvin 
(Cambridge: CUP). 
Star, Susan Leigh and Griesemer, James R. (1989). “Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary 
Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39,” Social 
Studies of Science 19:3, pp. 387–420. 
Sterrett, Susan (forthcoming). “Theory of Dimensions,” in the Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of 
Physics, forthcoming (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14093/). 
 
